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Abstract
In response to the recent opioid crisis, US states have implemented several policies to re-
duce the dispensing of opioids and contain drug mortality. We analyse the effectiveness
of these laws and their unintended fallouts on labour participation and crime at the local
level. Using multiple data sources and a difference-in-difference set-up, we show that the
laws targeting the supply for opioids yield larger reductions in prescribed drugs compared
to the demand-side policies, particularly in the absence of cross-bordering effects. We ob-
serve an improvement in labour market participation and higher crime rates following the
enforcement of some of the policies considered.
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1 Introduction
In 2016, according to the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) more than 52,000
Americans died of drug overdoses and three out of five deaths involved a form of prescrip-
tion opioid abuse. This figure corresponds to an average of four deaths every hour, i.e. more
than those caused by car crashes and shootings combined. Around 2 millions Americans cur-
rently suffer from a prescription painkiller abuse disorder and although the absolute incidence
is greatest in big cities like Chicago and Baltimore, the devastation also affects rural areas such
as Appalachia, New England and the Midwest. In fact, many of the victims hail from white
middle-class suburbs and rural towns.
Indeed, the misuse of and the addiction to opioids, which include prescription pain relievers,
heroin, and synthetic opioids such as fentanyl, constitute a serious national crisis affecting public
health as well as social and economic welfare. In October 2017, US President Donald Trump
defined the country’s opioid crisis as a “public health emergency” and one month later the US
Council of Economic Advisers reported the true cost of the opioid drug epidemic for the year
2015 to be around US$ 504 billion, corresponding to approximately 2.8% of the US GDP.1 As a
response to this dramatic crisis, many US states have progressively enacted a number of laws to
restrict the prescribing and the dispensing of controlled substances and to contain the mortality
rates linked to the abuse of opioids.
In this paper we assess the impact of five sets of opioid state laws on labour market conditions
and illegal activities at the local level. In doing so, we draw on a number of opioid-related
policies adopted in the US since the early 2000s, namely Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs
(PDMPs), Pain Management Clinics Laws (PMCLs), Doctor Shopping Laws (DSLs), Good
Samaritan Laws (GSLs) and Naloxone Access Laws (NALs). Some of these regulations are
targeted at reducing the amount of Prescription Opioids (POs) sold either on the demand
(DSLs) or the supply (PMCLs and PDMPs) side. Vice versa, NALs and GSLs have been
designed to decrease the number of fatal overdoses by providing incentives to abusers to seek
for medical assistance in case of an overdose emergency. Using a difference-in-difference set-up
and linking various sources of county-level panel data, we exploit the staggered timing in the
implementation of these laws across US states to identify their causal effect on local economic
and crime outcomes over the period 2000-2014.
First, we provide new empirical evidence on the effects of these opioid state laws on the
amount of drugs dispensed per capita. We focus on a variety of opium-based substances that
are classified as Schedule II or Schedule III drugs, which are associated to high and moderate
risks of abuse, as defined by the US Controlled Substances Act of 1970. We consider hydromor-
phone, methadone, meperidine, oxycodone, hydrocodone, fentanyl and morphine. Moreover,
following Brady et al. (2014), we account for the relative potency of these opiates, so that each
drug is converted into Morphine Equivalent units (MEs), which summarise the total amount of
1 This figure encompasses the costs of health care, lost productivity, criminal justice, plus the value of
statistical life, i.e. the estimated cost for each opioid-related overdose death. See the report by the Council of
Economic Advisers (2017) for details.
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(potentially substitute) active components sold. In this respect, we address the following ques-
tions: (i) does the implementation of these state laws actually reduce the amount of opioids
prescribed, and (ii) are the laws targeting the supply or those restraining the demand the most
effective in diminishing the quantity of prescription analgesics per capita?
On the one hand, we find that the implementation of supply-side opioid state laws and of
those contrasting opioid-related mortality reduce the grams of POs per capita sold. On the
other hand, we observe a weak positive effect of DSLs on POs, which casts some doubts on
the efficacy of laws aiming at the demand for opioids. In terms of magnitude, the negative
effect of the laws affecting the supply (particularly PMCLs) accounts to a 30% reduction in
POs dispensed. Notably, we estimate even larger effects in areas that are not adjacent to other
states, which indicates that the restrictions to POs are more effective when commuting to a
different state (and obtain the desired drugs there) is more costly. In terms of policy implication,
this result suggests that extending stricter regulations at the federal level might perhaps lead
to better efficacy.
Furthermore, we implement a battery of robustness checks and placeboes on our main re-
sults. These additional tests support our findings. Our results are stable and not systematically
affected by potential confounding factors, including the introduction of Medicare Part D in
2006 and the reformulation of OxyContin in 2010. On top of that, we estimate the link among
the amount of legally-dispensed POs, opioid state laws and mortality rates. We find statisti-
cally significant correlations with drug-related deaths while, as expected, we do not detect any
relationship with mortality related to other causes.
At a subsequent stage, we assess whether the set of laws impact other relevant dimensions
of local economies: (iii) do opioid state laws have an indirect impact on labour market partici-
pation and on illegal activities? In terms of theoretical prediction, the answer to this question
is ambiguous. According to one scenario, lowering the amount of dispensed POs may drive
people out of drug-abuse. Here, we would also expect an improvement in labour market con-
ditions at the local level. We observe that the reduction in the amount of POs following the
implementation of some opioid state laws leads to an increase in employment and a decrease
in both unemployment and inactivity rates. Interestingly, such effects are more pronounced for
females, whites and adults in the age range 25-64. A second hypothesis is that (heavy) users
might turn to the black market in response to the lower availability of legal POs, hence in-
creasing their propensity to commit drug-related crimes, while being in precarious employment
or even staying out of the labour force. Our findings also show a consistent increase in crime
rates, especially those related to the sale and possession of opium and synthetic drugs, coming
with the implementation of some laws. We corroborate this evidence exploiting a novel dataset
on incarceration rates at the local level. We notice that the supply-side regulations for pain
management clinics (PMCLs) have a positive unforeseen impact on the total prison population,
which poses further socio-economic and welfare challenges to the US system.
Our overall estimates capture the prevalent effects of the laws at the local level. Yet,
when we differentiate the analysis by the initial level of consumption of POs, we find that the
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improvements in the labour force participation dominate in the areas that are less exposed to
the consumption of opioids at the beginning of the period, while the increases in crime rates
prevail in the areas that suffer the highest initial exposure to POs.
Given its severity, it is not surprising that the impact of state policies on this dramatic
epidemic is being increasingly investigated. However, most of the works focus on health-related
issues or belong to the medical literature. Early contributions to the literature do not find
consistent evidence on the impact of opioid-related regulations on mortality rate and hospital
admissions, possibly due to the short time series of data employed. Brady et al. (2014) show
that PDMPs are not fully effective in reducing the amount of per capita opioids dispensed, while
Meara et al. (2016) do not observe any clear evidence of the impact of state laws on opioid abuse
behaviour. On the contrary, Popovici et al. (2017), who focus exclusively on the implementation
of PMCLs and DSLs, find weak negative effects of both types of laws on overdose mortality and
hospital admissions in a difference-in-difference framework. Additionally, Rees et al. (2017) find
a negative effect of NALs and GSLs on mortality, while Buchmueller and Carey (2018) detect an
effect in reducing the opioid misuse only when looking at the mandatory (“must-access”) version
of the PDMP. Finally, Alpert et al. (2018) show that the reformulation of OxyContin in 2010,
from being crushable to its abuse-deterrent version, increases the incidence of heroin-related
deaths.2
With our analysis we address the limited economic-oriented literature on the topic. In
doing so, we use a comprehensive setting: we look at the sets of regulations implemented at
the state level over a 15-year period and their implications for the supply and the demand for
POs. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that considers the effects of
state opioid regulations on the local labour market participation and among the very few that
look at illegal activities.3 While existing studies are typically unconcerned about the labour
market impacts of opioid-abuse regulations, those related to the economics of crime are rather
scant as well. Using a sub-sample of counties in the US, Mallatt (2017) estimates that the
implementation of PDMPs yields an overall drop in the amount of oxycodone dispensed while
causing an increase in heroin crimes in the most opioid-dense counties. In another paper, which
exploits timing and geographic location of a crackdown on legal pharmaceutical suppliers in
Florida, Meinhofer (2017) studies the supply-side effect of PDMPs on drug abuse and crimes.
She finds mild effects of spillovers from substitution to illegal drugs. With respect to the existing
studies, we are able to provide results that stem from the complete coverage of the US population
for a period of fifteen years and that refer to a broad list of criminal activities.4
This paper is also the first contribution analysing how the legal and illegal markets of
2 A growing body of the literature is also looking at the patients’ characteristics that predict opioid abuse,
such as mental health problems and histories of substance abuse (Ives et al., 2006; Pergolizzi et al., 2012), while
other papers examine the role played by physicians (Barnett et al., 2017; Currie and Schnell, 2018; Schnell, 2017).
3 A recent paper by Carpenter et al. (2017) estimates the relationship between economic conditions and
the use of illicit drugs (POs, cocaine, and heroin). They find that substance use disorders involving alcohol,
marijuana, analgesics, and hallucinogens are strongly countercyclical.
4 To our knowledge, there exists a third analysis on the relationship between opioids and crime by Deza et al.
(2017), which focus on violent and property crimes in a 5-year time interval (2007-2012). However, this is not
publicly available at the time of writing.
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opioids react to shocks to the supply and to the demand for POs. Under state and federal law,
selling controlled substances (including POs) without authorisation is considered as a felony.
The same applies to possessing controlled substances without a prescription. Despite these legal
deterrents, the illegal market remains a relevant source of POs for many users. This is especially
true for the heavier users, who might struggle to get out from addiction as policy markers are
restraining access to medical POs. This pattern is confirmed by the National Survey on Drug
Use and Health (NSDUH), according to which around 30% of interviewed misusers turn to
the illegal market to obtain their habitual supply of POs. Our results suggest that reducing
POs in the legal market may have unintended consequences on illegal activities. We find, in
fact, that PMCLs bring about a consistent two-fold increase in the arrest rates for property,
violent, drug related crimes and a significant rise in the incarceration rates. Per contra, GSLs
yield a decrease by 8 arrests every 1,000 inhabitants in reported total criminal activity and by
6.4 arrests every 1,000 inhabitants for drug-related crimes, which are likely to be due to the
immunity and mitigation in court granted to the person that seeks medical assistance under
these regulations.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 describes the opioid crisis and
the related policies implemented in the past decades. The data and the empirical strategy are
presented in section 3 and the main results in section 4. We discuss our findings in section 5.
2 Overview on Prescription Opioids
In this section we describe the opioid crisis that has struck the US in the recent decades. We
then illustrate the different policies that have been implemented over time across the US states
and we outline the theoretical predictions of the effects of these laws on the amount of POs
dispensed by practitioners, on labour market indicators and on crime.
2.1 The US Opioid Crisis
Opioids belong to a class of drugs derived from opium, a naturally occurring compound in
poppies that produces euphoria, pain relief, and sedation. These drugs have been used for
centuries for recreational and medicinal purposes because of their powerful analgesic effect.
They can be ingested, snorted or injected and are often co-abused with depressants such as
benzodiazepines to enhance the high. In some cases, particularly with fentanyl, they are laced
with heroin to strengthen its effect. Others, such as methadone and buprenorphine, are used
medically in replacement therapies for addicted users (Paulozzi, 2012). However, with prolonged
use the body starts relying on them and the user becomes physically dependent. The addiction
to these drugs produces a physical and psychological dependence that is hard to overcome and
results in devastating and painful consequences to the user.
Since the late 1990s, the rapid escalation in the use of prescription and non-prescription
opioid drugs has originated the so-called “opioid epidemic” or “opioid crisis” in the US. Over
the past thirty years opioids have been increasingly prescribed for the treatment of chronic
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non-cancer pain, such as back pain or osteoarthritis, and even though medical professionals
now recognise their side effects and their potential for abuse, they remain a staple of modern
pain management. As a result, this phenomenon has now reached alarming levels in the US,
with over 50,000 drug overdose deaths only in 2015, of which 63 per cent reportedly involving
opioids (Council of Economic Advisers, 2017).
Several key factors have contributed to the crisis. First, pharmaceutical companies have
marketed their drugs as safe and effective for treating pain despite evidence showing that in
most, but not all, cases the risks might outweigh the benefits. Many doctors and patients have
been initially persuaded by these advertising campaigns.5 Then, doctors have had to balance the
pressure received by advocacy groups (some of which were pharma-backed), medical associations
and increasing pressure to treat patients quickly and efficiently. Opioids provided a quick answer
to these problems. Also, some risk factors make certain sub-populations particularly vulnerable
to POs abuse, including people with mental illness or a history of other substance abuse and
those who live in rural areas and on a low income (Ives et al., 2006; Pergolizzi et al., 2012).
Finally, inappropriate and unnecessary prescriptions have brought to a scenario where there are
so many pills circulating – those prescribed in 2015 being enough “to medicate every American
around the clock for three weeks”, according to the CDC – that they are often diverted to
family members or friends of patients or to the black market.6
2.2 Opioid State Laws and Their Potential Effects
The reaction of the policy makers to the opioid crisis has come primarily at the state level, with
the implementation of different laws in different states at different times. The target of these
policies varies in terms of the individuals involved (patients, prescribers, pharmacists) and of the
types of limitation. Specifically, these regulations can be grouped into five categories, which are
described in Table 1, while the timing of their implementation across US states is summarised in
Figure A.1. In accordance with this classification, our identification of the effects of each policy
relies on the indicators provided by Mallatt (2017) and by Popovici et al. (2017).7 We look at
the response in terms of the amount of drugs sold in each area and of different socio-economic
outcomes such as the participation rate on the labour market and crime. Table 2 summarises
the expected effects of each set of regulations on the outcomes considered.
Two sets of regulations are meant to target the supply for POs. PDMP is the most commonly
and well-studied policy. It consists of state-level databases that monitor the prescription and
5 Purdue Pharma, the maker of OxyContin, and some of its higher-ups paid more than US$ 600 million
in fines in 2007 for their misleading marketing claims, and POs makers and distributors are now facing several
lawsuits on similar grounds.
6 Opioid users typically find their habitual dose of drug: from dealers/strangers (4.3%); from the internet
(0.1%); by other means (4.4%); from doctors (23.8%); buying/taking it from friends or relatives (14.6%); and
free from friends or relatives (53%). Those in the latter category report that their friends or relatives obtained
the drugs from doctors themselves 87% of the times (Meinhofer, 2017).
7 The variable PDMP comes from Mallatt (2017), the other indicators are taken from Popovici et al. (2017).
We also employ similar variables as computed by Meara et al. (2016), Rees et al. (2017) and Buchmueller and
Carey (2018) for robustness. Despite referring to different (or smaller) samples, when we use the indicators from
these other sources we obtain comparable results (omitted for brevity but available upon request).
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Table 1: Laws on Prescription Opioids
Law Name Description
PDMP
Prescription Drug
Monitoring Program
Implementation of a system that collects information on prescriptions
of controlled substances and that allows physicians and pharmacists to
view a patient’s prescribing history.
PCML
Pain Management
Clinics Law
Set of regulations concerning the minimum requirements for a pain
management clinic to be allowed to dispense prescription drugs.
DSL Doctor Shopping Law
Obligation for patients to reveal to a health care practitioner about
previous prescriptions received from other doctors and prohibition to
obtain drugs through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, etc.
GSL Good Samaritan Law
Laws that grant immunity from prosecution (or mitigation in sentence)
for people who call 911 in the case of an overdose emergency.
NAL Naloxone Access Law
Laws that provide immunity to health care professionals who prescribe
or administer naloxone to reverse an opioid overdose in case of
emergency.
the dispensing of controlled substances. The information contained in the system is available
to all authorised health-care providers including physicians and pharmacists with the purpose
of preventing improper drug prescription or dispensing and drug diversion. In some states,
under certain circumstances, prescribers and dispensers are required to access the PDMP by
law (hence, called “must-access”), while in others the use of this system is voluntary. Since
the early 2000s, PDMPs have been increasingly implemented across US states. Full national
coverage has been reached in 2017 with Missouri, which was the last state to adopt this type of
regulation.
PMCLs embody all regulations that aim at preventing inappropriate prescribing and dis-
pensing of controlled substances within clinics specialised in pain management. These clinics
have been such a great source of prescription drugs that they are sometimes called “Pill Mills”.
They have become such an increasing issue in the opioid epidemic that PMCLs have been imple-
mented in one every five states since the mid-2000s. Although there is substantial heterogeneity
across states, regulations associated with PMCLs typically provide for requirements concerning
the ownership, the licensing procedures, the operational standards and the personnel quali-
fication of pain management clinics, facilities or practice locations. These interventions have
resulted in a massive shutdown of pain management clinics that did not meet the new standards
(Meinhofer, 2017).
Both PDMPs and PMCLs induce a shock on the supply side of the market for POs, i.e. they
provide for restrictions to the agents supplying drugs (doctors and pharmacists). As a conse-
quence, we expect the two policies to have an unambiguously negative effect on the amount
of POs dispensed. On the one hand, (heavy) users might turn to the black market in substi-
tution for the legally dispensed POs, hence committing more drug-related crimes. Also, these
circumstances might be correlated with a lower propensity to work. Coherently, we might
find an increase in the risk of opioid-mortality possibly due to the lower quality of the drugs
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exchanged in the illegal markets. On the other hand, these laws potentially slow down the
diversion from the legal to the illegal market for drugs. Thus, it may be that the amount of
POs in the illegal market drops, indirectly forcing people out of drug-abuse. Then, we would
expect an improvement in the labour market measures. These latter hypotheses are in line with
our findings.
DSLs are also directed at reducing the amount of opioids sold but they involve the demand
side as they impose restrictions on the patients rather than on the suppliers. They refer to any
regulation that prohibits doctor shopping, i.e. the practice of obtaining controlled substances
from multiple healthcare practitioners without the prescribers knowledge of the other prescrip-
tions. The number of states that have adopted these laws has doubled since the year 2000,
and is currently around a third of the total. DSLs limit a patient’s ability to seek medications
from multiple providers and prohibit withholding of any information that may be relevant to
the physician or the pharmacist. Curtailing access to POs for non-medical use in this manner is
potentially effective as health care providers are the most commonly cited source for POs used
non-medically (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2014).
This set of regulations is expected to negatively affect the amount of opioids available on
the market from the demand side, especially when prescriptions are unnecessary or excessive.
Then, this would lower mortality, while the predicted impact on labour market participation
and crime would be equivalent to the one induced by PDMPs and PMCLs, as described above.
Nevertheless, there is some evidence of doctors over-prescribing in response to this policy. In
some circumstances, physicians may decide to prescribe higher doses of opioids to their patients
in order to avoid them accessing the black market. Schnell (2017) argues that although altruistic
physicians prescribe less opioids in the presence of a secondary (illegal) market, they also tend
to prescribe more on average (i.e. they are altruistic) the more they are concerned with their
patients’ health. In the same way, we conjecture that physicians might respond to doctor
shopping laws with an increase in the amount of opioids prescribed, to avoid that their patients
turn to the illegal and more dangerous market to take up drugs of lower quality and without
professional supervision.
Finally, as a consequence of the unprecedented increase in the number of overdose deaths
due to POs abuse, several states have implemented GSLs and NALs. These laws have been
designed and implemented with the intention to reduce the fatality rate linked to the abuse
Table 2: Theoretical Prediction of Opioid-Related Policies
Laws Predictions
ME Units
Dispensed
Mortality
Risk
L Mkt
Participation
Crime
PDMPs - -/+ -/+ -/+
PMCLs - -/+ -/+ -/+
DSLs -/+ -/+ -/+ -/+
GSLs -/+ -/+ -/+ -
NALs -/+ -/+ -/+ -
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of opioids. They aim at containing the number of fatal overdoses by providing incentives
and support to those seeking medical assistance in the case of an overdose emergency. NALs
allow to administer naloxone, a lifesaving medication that blocks or reverses the effects of an
opioid overdose, to individuals experiencing an overdose due to opioids without incurring in any
civil, criminal or disciplinary prosecution. GSLs grant some form of immunity or mitigation in
prosecution or at sentencing for people who call emergency medical assistance in the case of an
overdose. These laws have been enforced fairly recently (since 2010) in most of the states that
currently have such regulations. Their predicted effects are potentially ambiguous. On the one
hand, increased access to medical assistance and counselling, both in the case of NAL and of
GSL, might improve health and psychological conditions of drug abusers and persuade them to
quit drugs. In this case, we would expect an improvement in labour market outcomes and a
reduction in drug-related crimes. In particular, GSLs are expected to determine a reduction in
drug-related crimes because of the immunity and mitigation in court granted to the person that
seeks medical assistance. On the other hand, these laws reduce the opportunity costs associated
to drug abuse. Hence, we might observe an increase in the quantity of POs and a worsening of
labour market outcomes.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
In this section we describe how we combine various sources to build our main dataset. Then,
we illustrate the empirical strategy and provide some descriptive statistics.
3.1 Construction of the Dataset
The data on POs comes from the Automation of Reports and Consolidated Orders System
(ARCOS), which is run by the Office of Diversion Control of the US Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration. Since the Controlled Substance Act of 1970, in fact, manufacturers of controlled
substances are required to provide information on the amount of drugs produced and sold in
the US. Hence, the yearly ARCOS reports provide a record of the quantities (in grams) of each
controlled active ingredient sold in the US. This information is disaggregated at the 3-digit
zipcode level across all states of the US.
We focus our analysis on hydromorphone, methadone, meperidine, oxycodone, hydrocodone,
fentanyl and morphine. These are the most commonly used opioid analgesics and are classified
as Schedule II or Schedule III drugs.8 Additionally, we build an overall indicator that accounts
for the relative potency of these drugs, so that each drug is converted into Morphine Equivalent
(MEs) units.9 Since it considers the overall amount of opioids, this will be our main indicator
8 The order of the Schedule decreases with the abuse potential of the drug. For instance, heroin is classified
as a Schedule I substance, while Schedule V drugs include cough preparations with less than 200 mg of codeine
per 100 ml. Schedule II and Schedule III substances are considered to have a high to moderate potential for
abuse, respectively, and to lead to psychological or physical dependence.
9 In choosing the multipliers to convert into ME units we follow Brady et al. (2014). Hence, we rescale
substances according to the following: hydromorphone by 4, methadone by 7.5, meperidine by 0.1, oxycodone by
1, hydrocodone by 1, fentanyl by 75, morphine by 1.
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to quantify the consumption of POs.10
In order to build our dataset, we match the information on prescription drugs from ARCOS
to the official population intercensal estimates and the Bureau of Labour Statistic (BLS) labour
force data at the county level using the 2000 and the 2010 zip-to-county crosswalks produced
by the MABLE/Geocorr Application of the Missouri Census Data Center. The intercensal
estimates include counts of the overall population and by sex, age band and race/ethnicity
group, while the BLS data contains counts of the total number of employed and unemployed
people. In order to run the analysis on the labour market indicators by gender, race and age
sub-groups, we also aggregate individual information from the American Community Survey
(ACS) at the county level to our dataset. Then, we link them to the Uniform Crime Reporting
(UCR) Program Data provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which contains the
number of arrests disaggregated by county, by main demographic characteristics and by type of
crime. County-level arrest data consider both less serious and more frequent property criminal
activities, on the one hand, and more serious and less frequent violent crimes, on the other. Using
the UCR standard definitions, we divide the total crime category into two main components:
(i) violent, which includes murders, rapes, robberies and aggravated assaults, and (ii) property,
which covers burglaries, larcenies and motor-vehicle thefts. Additionally, we take into account
drug-related crimes that involve the possession and selling of different substances such as opium,
cocaine, marijuana and other synthetic drugs. Along with the UCR data on arrests, we also
exploit a novel dataset on incarceration rates at the county level provided by the Vera Institute
of Justice to corroborate our results on crimes.11 Data on mortality rates comes from the Global
Health Data Exchange (GHDx), which is run by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation
at the University of Washington.
Finally, we follow Autor et al. (2013) and convert all data to commuting zone (CZ) level.
This is to ensure a better estimation of the effects on the labour market and crime and alleviate
any concern related with migration flows.12 Our final sample comprises 741 commuting zones
across the US that we follow for 15 years (2000-2014). To our knowledge, this is the first paper
evaluating the effects of prescription drugs laws that exploits such an extensive dataset, both
in terms of time period and of geographical coverage.
3.2 Empirical Model
We employ a typical regression difference-in-difference setting such that:
Ycst = α+ βLawst +X
′
cstθ + δt + γc + cst, (1)
where Ycst is the outcome of interest measured in CZ c, in state s and in year t. The
set Lawst includes dummy variables for each regulation as from Table 1, which take value
10 The two definitions, POs and MEs, will be used interchangeably in the remainder of the paper.
11 As explained in their website (http://trends.vera.org/incarceration-rates), data on county jail pop-
ulation come from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), the Annual Survey of Jails (ASJ) and the Census of
Jails (COJ). See Kang (2015) for details.
12 Nevertheless, we also check the consistency of our results using county-based boundaries (see section 4).
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1 when the regulation is in force in a given state and 0 otherwise. Hence, the coefficient β
corresponds to the treatment effect of interest, as it should capture the effect of a regulation –
while controlling for the others – on different outcomes. We analyse such effect on the quantity
of drugs distributed, on labour market indicators and on crime.13 We also control for a set
X ′cst that contains information on the classic characteristics of the population in the CZ (total
population and shares by gender, age band and race), the CZ-specific share of the manufacturing
sector, the state GDP and two dummies for whether the state has passed a law on medical or
recreational use of marijuana, respectively. The economic variables are included to account for
differences in the industrial composition and economic conditions that might be correlated with
the average usage of POs in the area as suggested by Carpenter et al. (2017), while the indicators
for marijuana laws control for the potential substitution of opioids with medical marijuana.14
We also account for regional fluctuations by adding division-year fixed effects.15 Finally, we
include CZ and year fixed effects, while errors are clustered at the state level.16
A critical assumption for our identification strategy is that states enacting the policies and
those that do not adopt them must behave in a similar way in the pre-implementation period.
This is known as the parallel trends assumption, which posits that the average change in the
comparison group represents the counterfactual change in the treatment group if there were no
treatment. The event-study analysis represents the standard way to test for the existence of
trends in the pre-adoption period. Hence, we also estimate the following equation:
Ycst = α+
−1∑
pi=−4
βl,piLawl,st+pi +
4∑
τ=1
βl,τLawl,st+τ + β−lLaw−l,st +X ′cstθ + δt + γc + cst, (2)
which allows for 4 pre- and 4 post-treatment effects for each law l, while still controlling
for the enforcement of all the other laws (−l).17 For states that do not pass law l, we assign
an implementation year at random and center pi and τ accordingly. The remaining control
variables and fixed effects are defined as in Equation 1. According to this specification, leads
and lags are identified by the coefficients βl,pi and βl,τ , respectively. If the leads βl,pi are not
statistically different from zero, this implies we can assume that the parallel trends assumption
holds. The βl,τ coefficients, instead, allow us to examine whether the treatment effect of law l
fades, increases or stays constant over time.
13 Outcome variables for drugs are expressed in grams per capita, while for labour market and mortality
indicators we compute the share over the relevant population. Following the recent literature of crime, our
econometric specification exploits logarithms. As in Dix-Carneiro et al. (2017), we add one to the count of
criminal activities in order to circumvent sample selection issues that would emerge from deleting observations
with no reported crimes. We rescale the crime rate by 1,000 to facilitate the interpretation.
14 To rule out the possibility that economic factors might affect our estimated coefficients of interest, we also
run the model with a lagged set of control variables and find identical results.
15 Subscripts are omitted in favour of an easier notation.
16 The clustering of the errors at this geographical level derives from the fact that the treatment (i.e. the
introduction of the policies) is implemented at the state level. Yet, any other level of clustering provides better
results in terms of statistical power of our estimates.
17 In the case of NALs we can only identify 2 post-treatment effects, as these laws have been implemented in
very recent times.
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Additionally, we use equation 2 to implement a battery of placebo tests, where, following
Bertrand et al. (2004), we assign the treatment and the implementation year at random.18
3.3 Descriptive Analysis
Table A.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the main outcome and control variables used in
the analysis. Drug quantities are expressed in Morphine Equivalent grams per capita (MEs).
Overall, more than half a gram of ME units of opioids per capita was dispensed in the period
considered. This corresponds to around 230 kilograms of ME substances dispensed on average
in each CZ every year.This figure is computed by multiplying the average ME units (0.564) to
the average population in each CZ. The most commonly sold substances are oxycodone and
hydrocodone, with around 0.1 grams per capita.
Figure A.2 shows the average quantity of ME units of drugs sold year by year since the
introduction of each policy. The portion of the graphs to the left of the dashed vertical line
corresponds to the years prior to the onset of each law. The graph shows a clear increase in the
average amount of drugs dispensed per capita, which is only slowed down after the introduction
of the policies (to the right of the dashed line). The only exception seems to be DSLs, for which
only a temporary deceleration can be observed. In the case of PMCLs, conversely, the adoption
of the law yields a sharp decrease in the ME quantity sold.
Over the entire period considered (2000-2014) the average employment and unemployment
rates are around 58% and 4%, respectively (Table A.1). Moreover, on average, 5 criminal events
per 1,000 inhabitants are recorded in each CZ, most of which are property-related (around 4.5
crimes). A similar figure is reported for drug-related crimes, which are largely due to arrests
for drug possession.
Table 3 lists the ten CZs at the top and at the bottom ends of the distribution of MEs
sold on average during the period 2000 - 2014. Prescribing rates for opioids vary widely across
Table 3: Top and Bottom CZs by MEs Consumption
Top ME Consumption Bottom ME Consumption
CZ State MEs ERate URate IRate CZ State MEs ERate URate IRate
Daytona Beach FL 2.968 0.517 0.037 0.446 Van Horn TX 0.085 0.675 0.033 0.292
Cincinnati IN 1.769 0.612 0.041 0.348 McAllen TX 0.104 0.493 0.051 0.456
Birmingham AL 1.689 0.472 0.040 0.488 Eagle Pass TX 0.117 0.476 0.075 0.448
Medford OR 1.542 0.524 0.048 0.428 Crystal City TX 0.119 0.486 0.053 0.461
Bangor ME 1.526 0.583 0.037 0.381 Del Rio TX 0.120 0.507 0.038 0.455
Asheville NC 1.450 0.557 0.032 0.410 Alpine TX 0.125 0.575 0.048 0.377
Redding CA 1.439 0.495 0.052 0.453 Dupree SD 0.137 0.532 0.058 0.410
Pikeville KY 1.426 0.393 0.038 0.569 Sioux Center IA 0.158 0.704 0.022 0.274
Chico CA 1.405 0.509 0.059 0.432 Worthington MN 0.167 0.663 0.030 0.307
Eureka CA 1.366 0.509 0.042 0.449 Columbus NE 0.174 0.685 0.024 0.291
Average 1.658 0.517 0.043 0.440 Average 0.131 0.580 0.043 0.377
Note: for each CZ, we display the name of the most populous city.
18 We apply the following simulation procedure for each set of laws: first, we randomly select 25 states out of
50 and classify them as treated states, i.e. as if they were affected by the law; then, we draw a year at random
from a distribution between 2000 and 2014 and re-center leads and lags accordingly (Bertrand et al., 2004).
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states, with the highest (lowest) amounts sold in Delaware and Rhode Island (South Dakota and
Nebraska). This ranking provides descriptive evidence for substantial variations in MEs across
US CZs and within regions. For instance, Texas contains many CZs in the bottom distribution
of MEs but also CZs (such as Seymour, TX) which belong to the top ten percentile. As far as
the labour market conditions, measured by the employment (ERate), unemployment (URate)
and inactivity (IRate) rates, we can observe a positive association between worse labour market
outcomes and high consumption of ME units. As the bottom row of Table 3 suggests, the
average performance of the CZs in the high end of the ME consumption distribution is different
from the one of the CZ belonging to the bottom end of the same distribution. For instance, the
difference in the employment rates (0.517 and 0.580, respectively) amounts to 6.3 percentage
points.
Additionally, Figure A.3 in Appendix describes the geographical distribution of the aver-
age MEs in the years 2000 and 2014 (top and bottom panels, respectively). We observe an
unambiguous variation across CZs and years, with the colder (darker blue) areas, distributed
predominantly in the central regions, indicating lower levels of POs per capita. Vice versa,
the warmer (darker red) the area, the higher the consumption of MEs. This is the case of
the Atlantic and the Pacific coastal regions. At the same time, the two maps demonstrate an
extraordinary increase in opioid usages across the country during the last fifteen years. Indeed,
had we considered the 2000 quartile distribution for the year 2014 as well, we would have ob-
tained an almost entirely dark red map. As a matter of fact, the top percentile of the average
MEs distribution in 2000 roughly matches the threshold of the first quartile for the year 2014.
4 Results
In this section we present the results of our analysis. We first analyse which set of policies
is more effective in reducing the amount of total ME units sold in each CZ. Then, we check
whether the regulations affect the mortality rate associated to different causes. Finally, we
investigate their indirect impact on the labour market participation and on criminal activity.
4.1 Prescription Opioids
Table 4 shows the main results on the amount of ME prescription drugs sold in each CZ. In
columns 1 to 5 we consider one set of state laws at a time, while in columns 6 to 9 we include
all five law indicators in the same regression. Our preferred specification is the one shown in
column 8, as it includes not only CZ and year dummies but also division-year fixed effects,
which should account for regional fluctuations over time. Moreover, it controls for all types of
opioid-related laws at the same time, so that the effect of each one of them is correctly accounted
for. Nevertheless, the coefficients in this specification are consistent with the ones displayed in
columns 1-5.
Our empirical evidence generally suggests a reduction in POs following the enforcement of
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Table 4: Effect on Drug Quantities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent variable MEs MEs MEs MEs MEs MEs MEs MEs MEs
PDMP -0.029 0.036* -0.013 -0.012 -0.040
(0.040) (0.021) (0.034) (0.029) (0.029)
PMCL -0.172*** -0.085*** -0.153*** -0.169*** -0.275***
(0.034) (0.021) (0.023) (0.026) (0.066)
DSL 0.013 0.033 0.061 0.074* 0.154***
(0.047) (0.041) (0.049) (0.039) (0.052)
NAL -0.011 0.039 0.038 -0.014 0.072
(0.059) (0.041) (0.026) (0.035) (0.053)
GSL -0.130* -0.065 -0.076* -0.121** -0.181*
(0.071) (0.039) (0.040) (0.048) (0.091)
Observations 11,115 11,115 11,115 11,115 11,115 11,115 11,115 11,115 11,115
R-squared 0.813 0.815 0.812 0.812 0.814 0.795 0.799 0.817 0.967
Weights X X X X X X X X
Year-Division FE X X X X X X X
State Linear Trends X
Note: Population-weighted OLS estimates, where the weight is computed as the share of the population in the
CZ relative to the national population. All regressions include year and CZ fixed effects. Other controls include
indicators for: population, share of females, share of people in working age, share of over65, share of whites, share
of manufacturing, state GDP, state laws on marijuana. Errors are clustered at the state level.
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
most state laws.19 The effects that we find in the specification described above are confirmed
by the event-study analysis based on Equation 2 that is shown in Figure 1. In all cases the
reported plots suggest that the parallel trend assumption holds, as the coefficients in the pre-
treatment period are never statistically different from zero. This indicates that there is no
plausible systematic pattern in ME units sold prior to the introduction of any opioid state law.
In other words, it provides empirical support to the statement that in the absence of treatment
the drugs sold per capita in the treatment and the control units do not differ from each other
significantly.
We observe an overall negative effect of the laws targeting the supply side on the amount of
MEs dispensed, particularly in the case of PMCL. The two policies have a negative impact on
the dependent variable: while the effect of PDMP is negative but somewhat weak, being it in
the range between -0.03 and -0.05 p.p. in the first two years, PMCL appears to yield a sharp and
large decrease by around -0.15 to -0.23 p.p. in the quantity of POs sold right after the second
year since the enactment of this law. Likewise, the magnitude of the coefficient from Table 4
suggests that the introduction of PMCL leads to an average reduction in the amount of ME
units by 0.17 grams, i.e. by 30%. A similar pattern occurs for the two laws aiming at reducing
the number of fatal overdoses, namely NALs and GSLs. The former triggers the reduction in
POs after the first year, while the latter has a more sudden impact, although it appears to fade
after a while.20 Yet, the average effect predicted by the coefficient associated to GSL, implies
a significant reduction in ME units by 21%. In both cases, the decrease in POs is likely to be
due to an improved access to medical assistance that these laws promote.
19 We test whether the effects are driven by outliers so we run the model excluding one state at the time and
find consistent results (omitted for brevity).
20 There are only two lags for NALs because of their very recent implementation.
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Figure 1: Event-Study Analysis: Effect on Drug Quantities
Note: Coefficients are estimated as in Equation 2. 95% confidence intervals are shown and standard errors are
clustered at the state level.
The only exception to this overall negative impact is due to the regulations tackling doctor
shopping behaviour (DSL). The enforcement of DSLs yields an overall rise in POs dispensed by
13%, however the evidence is not particularly robust, as the event-study analysis displays pos-
itive but not statistically significant coefficients in the post-treatment period. We suspect that
this (however weak) increase might be due to the physicians over-prescribing opioid painkillers
even after the enactment of these laws, in order to avoid that patients would turn to the il-
legal drug market, where they might find uncontrolled substances and use them without any
supervision. If the patients are aware of such mechanism, then the policy becomes ineffective.
In order to further corroborate the validity of our analysis, we run a battery of placebo
tests based on equation 2 where the date of implementation for each policy is drawn at random
(Figure A.4), as explained in section 3. In the presence of strong heterogeneity in trends, the
placebo treatments would show an effect comparable with our baseline coefficients. Here, the
lack of statistical significance for the estimated coefficients in both the pre- and the post-periods
supports our strategy.
In addition to the placebo tests, we run some robustness checks, which are displayed in
Table A.2. Column 1 reports the same specification as column 8 from Table 4, with the exception
that estimates are now weighted by the population in the CZ. Estimated coefficients are in line
with the previous results. In column 2 we account for the introduction of Medicare Part D
in 2006, a federal program that subsidizes the costs of prescription drugs and of prescription
drug insurance premiums for Medicare beneficiaries. The exposure to this new social security
program is proxied by the share of people aged 65 or over, interacted with a dummy variable
that takes value 1 in the years after 2006 and 0 otherwise. As expected, the amount of POs
sold increases with a higher exposure to the Medicare Part D program, but the estimated
coefficients associated to the five laws do not differ from the baseline. In column 3 we consider
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the reformulation of OxyContin that took place in 2010 and that made it more difficult to
abuse this drug (Evans et al., 2017). Hence, we include an interaction between the amount of
oxycodone sold in each CZ in 2000 and a dummy that takes value 1 in the years after 2010.21
In this case, the coefficient associated to the interaction term is statistically significant and
suggests that the reformulation of OxyContin has brought about an increase in the amount
of opioid prescribed by 0.7 grams of ME units. Previous works show that the reformulation
of OxyContin has been followed by a significant drop in the number of prescriptions of this
drug across the US (Alpert et al., 2018; Schnell, 2017). At the same time, however, there is
also evidence of substitution towards other opium-based substances, especially fentanyl (Alpert
et al., 2018), which is likely to be the driver of such positive effect. Yet, this does not change the
main results, suggesting that the introduction of the abuse-deterrent formulation of OxyContin
does not influence the impact of the laws on the amount of POs.
Furthermore, we test whether the specification based on CZs yields different results than
the one based on county administrative boundaries (Table A.3). We do this because of two
reasons. First, the definition of CZ does not perfectly align with state borders.22 Given that
our treatment varies at the state level, we want to ensure that the effects of the laws are not
confounded by discrepancies in border definition. Column 1 displays the estimated coefficients
for such county-based specification, which are consistent with the main results from Table 4:
the onset of PMCLs and GSLs yield a reduction in ME units by 30 and 26%, respectively, while
DSLs determine an increase by 17%; the effect of the other laws is statistically null. Second,
we want to be able to distinguish between areas that are adjacent to another state (i.e. outer
counties) and those that are not (i.e. inner counties). It may be that the opioid state laws do
not have an identical effect on the consumption of POs across counties that belong to the same
state because some users, especially those residing close to another state, might cross the border
in their search for drugs. A crude hint is given by the differences in ME units per capita sold.
These amount to 0.53 grams in the inner counties, and to 0.58 in the outer counties. These
figures indicate that the quantity of POs sold in the counties that are far away from the state
border tends to be lower than in the case where people face a shorter distance to travel to get
to a different state and obtain their drugs there. However, the quantity of MEs sold in counties
that share their border with a state where opioid laws are not enforced is even lower (0.47 grams
per capita), suggesting the existence of some kind of opioid-related border-crossing behaviour.
Column 2 shows the effects for all counties that do not share their border with another
state, while columns 3 and 4 pertain to outer counties where the adjacent state has at least one
opioid law and does not have any of such laws enforced, respectively. As expected, most laws
are more powerful in the inner counties, where coefficients imply stronger effects in terms of
magnitude and of statistical significance. For the counties that share the border with another
state the heterogeneous response to the implementation of the laws supports the existence of the
21 This methodology is equivalent to the one used by Alpert et al. (2018), Evans et al. (2017) and Mallatt
(2017).
22 We aggregate our data at the CZs level because they are generally recognised as the ideal geographical unit
when evaluating labour market outcomes, to alleviate any migration flow concerns across CZs.
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cross-bordering effect hypothesised above. In particular, the consumption of POs in the outer
counties that are adjacent to a regulated state does not seem to react much to the enforcement
of opioid state laws: PCMLs yield a drop in POs by only 14% and DSLs have a statistically
weak positive impact by 14%. Conversely, when the state across the border does not have any
opioid state law in place, the quantity of POs per capita is drastically reduced by the enactment
of PMCLs (by 47%), NALs (by 31%) and GSLs (by 14%). In the former case, opioid users from
outside are more likely to commute to the county to obtain the desired drug, hence the demand
remains high even when a law is enacted.23 In the latter case, the users residing in the county
might choose to commute to the contiguous unregulated state, hence reinforcing the negative
impact of the laws on the amount of ME units per capita. This result is particularly important
in terms of policy implication because it suggests that in the absence of confounding cross-
bordering effects the impact of the opioid-related policies would be much higher than the one
we estimate overall.
In Table A.4 we break up the effect of the state laws distinguishing between CZs with low
(Panel A), medium (Panel B) and high (Panel C) exposure to POs. In doing so, we fix the
distribution of MEs units at the first available year, that is 2000, and we define the exposure
to POs as low, medium and high based on the overall distribution of MEs in 2000. Column 1
shows the differentiated effects of the laws on the amount of POs dispensed. Here, the estimated
coefficients imply the existence of stronger effects the higher the initial consumption of legal
POs in the CZ.24
Finally, we look at the effect of the state laws on the different substances deriving from
opiates that we consider in the main indicator (ME), namely hydromorphone, methadone,
meperidine, oxycodone, hydrocodone, fentanyl and morphine (Table A.5). Coefficients show
that the negative impact of the introduction of PMCLs is clearly driven by the decreases induced
on methadone (by 0.08 grams per capita), oxycodone and hydrocodone (both by around 0.03
grams per capita) and fentanyl (by 0.003 grams per capita). Recent works by Mallatt (2017)
and Meinhofer (2017) find that PMCLs induce a reduction in the quantity of oxycodone per
capita by 18% and 59%, respectively. Our estimates for oxycodone (and its close substitute
hydrocodone) lay within this range, with an average drop by 30%. As far as NALs and GSLs
are concerned, we find that the former yield very slight reductions in some substances and no
changes in others, while in the latter case the overall decrease we find on the ME indicator is
due to a drop in the quantity of oxycodone by 47% (column 4).
4.2 Mortality Rates
Since the late 1990s, a reversal in the downward mortality trends, as well as in morbidity rates,
has been observed in the United States. Many studies correlate the increased availability of POs
for pain treatment with the rise in the mortality rate (e.g. Case and Deaton, 2015). Hence, we
assess the relation between the amount of ME units and the mortality rate in Table A.6, Panel
23 The average quantity of MEs in these counties is 0.71 grams per capita.
24 Similar results are found when we exclude from the sample all states that had at least one of the laws
implemented by 2000. This applies to both Tables A.4 and A.10 (see discussion in the next subsections).
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A. First, we observe a strong correlation between POs and mortality rate associated to mental
and substance use disorders, which include several forms of drug addiction. This evidence is
coherent with the recent medical literature such as Han et al. (2015). Moreover, we find that
POs are positively and statistically related to mortality rate for pain-generating conditions that
are typically treated with opioids, namely injuries. For cancer we obtain a large coefficient
but this is not significant. Conversely, no link is found with other non-communicable diseases
(skin, eye, oral diseases and congenital defects) and deaths caused by force of nature (including
conflicts and terrorism). We implement this latter battery of robustness checks as placebo, as
there is no predicted relation between these causes of mortality and the use of opioids.
In Panel B we examine the effect of the state policies on mortality rate. We do not expect to
observe the enforcement of the laws analysed to be linked to mortality for reasons that are not
directly related to opioid use (namely, mental and substance use disorders). Patients diagnosed
with conditions such as cancer are typically prescribed opioids to treat the pain provoked by the
disease, not to cure the disease itself. As a matter of fact, we do not find systematic statistically
significant associations between the enactment of the state policies and the mortality rate for
reasons other than drug use, with the exception of death by injury and GSLs, where the negative
coefficient might be due to the increased access to medical assistance fostered by the law.
4.3 Labour Market Conditions
We then turn to look at whether the state policies to contrast the opioid crisis have an unin-
tended impact on labour participation. This is a novel result, as, to our knowledge, there is no
existing empirical evidence in the literature on this matter.
Table 5: Effect on Labour Participation
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable ERate URate IRate
Panel A:POs
MEs -0.002 0.001** 0.001
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Panel B: Laws
PDMP -0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
PMCL 0.006** -0.003*** -0.003
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
DSL 0.006** 0.001 -0.008***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
NAL 0.002 -0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
GSL -0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 11,115 11,115 11,115
Note: Population-weighted OLS estimates. Includes year, CZ and
division-year fixed effects. Other controls include indicators for: see
note to Table 4. Errors are clustered at the state level.
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
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First, we evaluate the effect of average opioid consumption on the overall employment,
unemployment and inactivity rates (Table 5). In Panel A we find some (however weak) evidence
that the amount of POs sold is negatively related to employment. In particular, the quantity of
ME units sold is positively and statistically linked to the unemployment rate. Conversely, we
observe a slight improvement in the labour market indicators due to the enactment of opioid
state laws (Panel B), especially in the case of the ones that aim at reducing the amount of
POs (PMCL and DSL). Both policies yield an increase in the average employment rate by 0.6
p.p., or by 1%. Moreover, the introduction of PMCL causes a 8% (0.3 p.p.) decrease in the
unemployment rate, while the restrictions on the demand-side (DSL) decrease the inactivity
rate by around 2%. We do not observe any impact of the set of regulations aimed at decreasing
the number of deaths such as in the case of NAL and GSL. As with the case of ME units, the
compliance of our estimates to the parallel trends assumptions is supported by the event-study
analysis shown in Figure A.5. The weakness of the estimated effects is understandable if we
consider that the overall rates are computed as a crude measure of labour market performance,
since it follows the BLS approach and it is based on all individuals aged 16 or over.
Next, we look at whether these overall effects on labour participation are related to the
extent to which a CZ is exposed to the consumption of POs. Columns 2-4 in Table A.4 denote
the existence of some heterogeneity, with participation sensibly improving in the CZs with low
to medium levels of initial consumption of POs (Panel A and B). Conversely, the CZs with high
levels of dispensed ME units per capita in 2000 do not seem to be affected by the enforcement
of state opioid laws. These results suggest that the sets of opioid laws successfully stimulate the
labour participation in areas characterised by lower levels of initial consumption of POs where,
perhaps, the share of heavy opioid users is smaller and therefore it might be that more people
manage to escape drug abuse and return to work.
We then break down the impact of the policies on labour market indicators by gender, race
and age group. To do so, however, we cannot run the analysis for the entire period considered
in the main specifications. Instead, we use the individual data taken from ACS that we then
aggregate at the CZ level. Such information, however, is only available from 2005 onwards, which
means that for this part of our study we can only rely on a sample of circa 7,400 observations.
When we run the whole analysis on this sub-sample we find that coefficients always match those
of the benchmark in terms of sign, magnitude and significance.25
The estimates by gender, race and age group are reported in Tables A.7, A.8 and Table A.9,
respectively. The overall results for PMCL are consistent with those on the whole population,
while DSL seem to rise unemployment and inactivity rates for some groups. In the case of
the other policies, which did not display any relationship with labour participation in the main
sample, the evidence is now suggesting that, at least for some categories, they do enhance the
labour market prospects. However, NALs do not follow the same pattern, perhaps due to their
very recent enforcement.
25 Results omitted and available upon request.
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4.4 Crime
This section describes the effect of the supply- and the demand-side interventions and of the
mortality prevention state laws on crime rates. Theoretically, it is unclear whether the contrac-
tion of the legally dispensed POs due to the implementation of the laws will increase or decrease
crime. On the one hand, criminal activities might rise if drug burglary, rather than the typical
consensual doctor-user transaction, becomes the preferred way to divert POs (Meinhofer, 2017).
Moreover, a restriction on the legal suppliers might influence crime through its impact on the
illegal drug market as the demand for substitute illegal drugs increases. On the other hand, it
is possible that some users might quit their addiction as a consequence of better monitoring of
POs from the health care system. They will, then, be less prone to commit crime especially once
their labour market participation improves. We provide empirical evidence of the impact of the
five sets of state laws on various illegal activities. We evaluate whether these laws have any
unintended effects on the participation to criminal activities using both crime and incarceration
rates.
Table 6 shows the relationship between POs and total crimes (Panel A). In particular, we
distinguish between violent, property and drug-related crimes, while in column 5 we assess the
correlation with the incarceration rate computed from the Vera Institute of Justice dataset.
Violent crimes consist in the “most aggressive” component of criminal activity, where offenders
use or threaten force upon their victims. These include murder, rape, robbery and aggravated
assault. Nevertheless, some criminal acts, such as robberies, are included among the violent
category even though their final aim is more related to economic crimes. On the contrary,
property crimes generally involve taking the property of other people (burglary, larceny and
vehicle theft) while drug felonies relate to the possession and/or the sale of illegal substances.
Drug users often crave for higher doses over time and this may increase their likelihood to
Table 6: Effect on Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Violent Property Drug Incarceration
Police
Dependent variable Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes Rate
Panel A: POs
MMEs 0.036 0.022 0.043 0.020 -0.102 0.366
(0.072) (0.067) (0.070) (0.073) (-0.268) (0.382)
Panel B: Laws
PDMP -0.164 -0.153 -0.156 -0.102 -0.540 -0.075
(0.135) (0.119) (0.131) (0.107) (0.540) (0.127)
PMCL 1.098** 0.962*** 1.050** 1.185*** 2.300*** -0.388
(0.413) (0.344) (0.407) (0.418) (0.790) (0.311)
DSL -1.330 -1.064 -1.309 -1.321 1.670 -0.851
(0.813) (0.697) (0.793) (0.818) (1.458) (0.577)
NAL 0.014 0.037 0.008 0.092 -1.330 -0.023
(0.256) (0.245) (0.245) (0.268) (0.937) (0.271)
GSL -1.340** -1.235*** -1.284** -1.500*** -1.082 0.329
(0.533) (0.451) (0.520) (0.547) (0.748) (0.342)
Observations 11,115 11,115 11,115 11,115 10,800 11,115
Note: Population-weighted OLS estimates. Includes year, CZ and division-year fixed effects.
Other controls include indicators for: see note to Table 4. Errors are clustered at the state level.
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
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commit property-related crimes, especially when they need to steal valuables that would allow
them to meet their habits.
The empirical evidence describes the absence of a correlation between prescription drugs
and crime rates (Panel A). In Panel B, we report the impact of the state laws as from the
difference-in-difference framework. The corresponding event-study analysis is shown in Fig-
ures A.6 and A.7. We find that PMCLs have a positive and significant impact on all types
of crime and on the incarceration rates, while GSLs significantly reduce the reported criminal
activities. According to the estimated coefficients, the enactment of PMCLs yields a two-fold
increase in all types of crime and a significant rise in the incarceration rate. Enforcing GSLs,
instead, determines almost 8 less property or violent crimes and 6.4 less drug-related arrests
every 1,000 inhabitants. From this perspective, it seems that the state laws affecting the supply
for opioids (i.e. PMCLs) are not effective in terms of social desirability, while GSLs are. Never-
theless, it worth noting that this result is partially expected because GSLs provide for immunity
or mitigation in sentence for people who reach out for emergency services in case of an overdose
episode, therefore the negative effect that we find is somewhat mechanical. The other sets of
laws, namely PDMPs, DSLs and NALs, do not appear to have any statistically relevant overall
effect on crime. The final column of Table 6 is a relevant test for the analysis of the impact of
the state laws on crime, since it may be that POs consumption, criminal activities and arrest
rates are affected by unobserved differences in policing public expenditure across areas. We
check whether this is the case by estimating Equation 1 on the share of police officers per 1,000
inhabitants. Column 6 shows the absence of any correlation between ME units per capita or
opioid state laws on the police force employed in each CZ, suggesting that such issue does not
apply to our setting.26
As with the outcomes discussed previously, we break up the effect of the state laws on
crimes distinguishing between CZs with low (Panel A), medium (Panel B) and high (Panel C)
exposure to POs based on the distribution of ME units per capita in 2000 (Table A.10). Here,
we observe consistently and coherently stronger positive effects in the CZs with higher exposure
to POs, while little impact is detected in the less exposed CZs. As a matter of fact, some
of the coefficients in Panel A indicate that the enforcement of the laws reduces drug-related
crimes in some cases. This is somewhat expected, given the earlier discussion of the effects on
labour market participation. If we combine the two sets of results, the evidence supports the
hypothesis that the implementation of opioid state laws leads people out of drug abuse and
fosters the engagement in the labour market in the CZs that present lower levels of dispensed
POs per capita. Vice versa, the areas where the consumption of opioids has always been very
high are less likely to be positively affected by the enforcement of the laws, which eventually
produce an increase drug-related crimes. Such result is particularly relevant in terms of policy
as it implies large local unintended effects of supply-side regulations on crime in those CZs that
are characterised by the highest levels of drug consumption at the beginning of the period.
In Table 7 we assess the effect of the laws on each sub-category of drug-related crimes. The
26 We also check for differentiated impacts across all categories of violent and property crime and find that
the estimates confirm results outlined above (results omitted).
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Table 7: Effect on Crime: Drug Crimes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Possession Sale
Dependent variable Opium Synthetic Marijuana Other Opium Synthetic Marijuana Other
PDMP -0.086 -0.104 -0.203* -0.094 -0.094 0.013 -0.041 -0.037
(0.086) (0.083) (0.103) (0.072) (0.081) (0.106) (0.072) (0.081)
PMCL 0.498*** 0.068 0.277 -0.041 0.326* 0.119 0.086 -0.053
(0.167) (0.151) (0.168) (0.130) (0.179) (0.134) (0.137) (0.116)
DSL 0.062 0.395* 0.063 0.199 0.098 0.567*** -0.019 0.170
(0.246) (0.218) (0.316) (0.167) (0.216) (0.166) (0.166) (0.174)
NAL 0.253 0.535** -0.077 0.164 0.219 0.359* 0.326 0.526***
(0.223) (0.217) (0.235) (0.144) (0.172) (0.194) (0.197) (0.151)
GSL -0.595*** -0.848*** -0.672*** -0.436*** -0.405** -0.714*** -0.485*** -0.242
(0.218) (0.240) (0.193) (0.095) (0.179) (0.243) (0.167) (0.188)
Observations 11,115 11,115 11,115 11,115 11,115 11,115 11,115 11,115
Note: Population-weighted OLS estimates. Includes year, CZ and division-year fixed effects. Other controls
include indicators for: see note to Table 4. Errors are clustered at the state level. The category ‘Opium’
comprises cocaine, opium and their derivatives; ‘Other’ encompasses all other non-narcotics.
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
positive impact of PMCLs is clearly driven by the possession and the sale of opium, cocaine and
their derivatives such as morphine, heroin and codeine (columns 1 and 5), for which arrest rates
rise by half and by a third, respectively. The increase that follows the enactment of DSLs is
due to highly-addictive synthetic narcotics such as pethidine and methadone (columns 2 and 6).
Here, arrests go up by around 40-50%. A roughly similar effect occurs with the introduction of
NALs, which also brings about an increase in the sale of other non-narcotics. Conversely, GSL
yields a substantial decrease in the reported crimes related to all types of illegal substances as
expected.
Finally, when we investigate the different reactions by age group (Table A.11), we find a
more prominent effect for the young adults in the age bands 16-24 and 25-44. This result is in
line with the statistics on the relative use of opioids by age. Moreover, the overall absent effect
of PDMPs on crime becomes now negative and statistically significant, particularly for opium
and synthetic drug crimes of the youngest group, while increasing the arrests due to the sale of
other non-narcotics. These also rise following the enforcement of GSLs.
5 Discussion
The United States are currently struck by an unprecedented epidemic of drug overdoses. This
phenomenon has began in the 1990s due to a dramatic increase in the use of prescription opioids
for chronic pain and is still causing tens of thousands of deaths across the country every year. In
fact, drug overdose deaths in the United States more than tripled from 1999 to 2015. According
to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2017), in 2006 doctors wrote 72.4 opioid prescriptions per 100 persons. The prescription rate
has been increasing by 4.1% annually until 2008 and by 1.1% annually from 2008 to 2012 and
has finally started to decrease since 2012, reaching a rate of 66.5 per 100 persons in 2016. That
year, 19.1 per 100 persons received one or more opioid prescriptions, with 3.5 prescriptions per
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patient on average.
Our analysis suggests that the recent declining trends in opioid prescriptions might be due
to the new sets of policies that have been implemented at the state level in recent years and
that were designed to contain the opioid crisis. Among these we find two main types of laws.
One aims at the reduction in the quantity of opioids prescribed by physicians or dispensed by
pharmacists and tackles both the supply (with PDMP and PMCL) and the demand (through
DSL) of opioids. The other one consists of laws that were enacted to contain opioid mortality
(NAL and GLS). We assess the effects of these policies on grams of opioids sold, on labour
market participation and on crime.
We find that the state laws targeting the supply for opioids yield an overall reduction in
the quantity of ME units per capita, particularly in the case of PCMLs, which have brought to
the closure of a considerable number of the so-called “pill mills”. As a consequence, the overall
labour market participation increases, but the shock on the availability of POs also leads people
to the illicit market for drugs. PDMPs, instead, are less effective in reducing the ME units sold
and in affecting the labour market indicators. Their enforcement is followed by a slight decrease
in the drug-related crime rates among those aged below 25, suggesting that PDMPs might hit
the illicit market for drugs that targets the youngsters. Per contra, regulating the demand for
opioids through DSLs appears to be inadequate, as they determine a slight increase in MEs and
in crime rates, especially for the sale and the possession of synthetic drugs.
As regards the state laws contrasting drug-related mortality, they generally induce a drop in
the amount of drug sold, especially GSLs. As in the case of the supply-side regulations, labour
participation increases after the implementation of GSLs. The effect for NALs is statistically
null, but this is not surprising when considering that NALs have been introduced very recently
and that their effects on the labour market might be delayed. Moreover, crime rates increase
particularly for the sale and possession of opium and synthetic drugs following the enactment of
NALs, while the drop in all types of criminal activities coming after GSLs is somewhat expected
given the features of these regulations.
Our results suggest important policy implications. First, the policies that reduce the amount
of prescriptions on the supply-side and those aiming at reducing the mortality from opioids do
have a negative effect on the quantity of prescription drugs sold. DSLs, on the contrary, are
clearly ineffective.
Second, we show that the power of these laws is stronger in the absence of cross-bordering
effects. This implies that if they were to be applied across all states, their impact on the amount
of prescribed drug would possibly be even higher.
Third, the policies that reduce prescriptions have an important indirect effect on labour
market participation and on crime. On the one hand, they induce higher participation rates
in the labour market, particularly in the areas where people make less use of opioids in the
pre-treatment period. On the other hand, they yield an increase in criminal offenses and arrest
rates, especially in the case of drug-related crimes. In most cases, this rise is driven by the sale
and the possession of opium and synthetic drugs, suggesting that even if these laws do in fact
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reduce POs in the legal market, they also have an unintended fallout on the market for illicit
substances. These increases are more likely to occur in areas with higher initial levels of POs
per capita.
Finally, developing effective tools to regulate and alleviate the costs of opioid crisis and its
unintended effects should be a high priority on the agenda of policy makers and economists.
This is especially relevant when these costs translate into less job opportunities and higher rates
of criminal activities. Policy makers should consider the collateral cost of restriction laws that
may create some rooms for the illegal sectors and smuggling in the black market.
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Appendix
Figure A.1: Onset of Opioid-Related Policies by Year
Note: Each marker corresponds to the total number of states in which a given
policy is in effect in a given year.
Figure A.2: Average MEs Dispensed by Year since/to the Introduction of the Policies
Note: The labels in the x-axis are such that the zero, the negative and the
positive values correspond to the year of, the years before and the years after
the introduction of each policy, respectively. Treated states only.
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Figure A.3: Geographical Distribution of MEs in 2000 (top) and in 2014 (bottom)
Figure A.4: Event Study: Placeboes on Drug Quantities
Note: Coefficients are estimated as in Equation 2. 95% confidence intervals are shown and standard errors are
clustered at the state level.
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Figure A.5: Event-Study Analysis: Effect on Labour Participation
Note: Coefficients are estimated as in Equation 2. 95% confidence intervals are shown and standard errors are
clustered at the state level.
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Figure A.6: Event-Study Analysis: Effect on Crime (I)
Note: Coefficients are estimated as in Equation 2. 95% confidence intervals are shown and standard errors are
clustered at the state level.
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Figure A.7: Event-Study Analysis: Effect on Crime (II)
Note: Coefficients are estimated as in Equation 2. 95% confidence intervals are shown and standard errors are
clustered at the state level.
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Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name Mean St. Dev.
Prescription Opioids (in grams per capita):
Morphine Equivalent units (MEs) 0.564 0.398
Hydromorphone 0.003 0.003
Methadone 0.024 0.032
Meperidine 0.012 0.011
Oxycodone 0.115 0.087
Hydrocodone 0.110 0.078
Fentanyl 0.001 0.001
Morphine 0.053 0.037
Labour Market:
Employment rate 0.575 0.076
Unemployment rate 0.037 0.014
Inactivity rate 0.388 0.071
Crime rates (per 1,000 inhabitants):
Total crimes 5.804 5.015
Violent crimes 1.336 1.659
Property crimes 4.468 3.588
Total Drug crimes 4.277 4.027
Drug possession 3.413 3.345
- Opium/Cocaine 0.474 0.886
- Synthetic 2.121 2.174
- Marijuana 0.243 0.402
- Other 0.564 0.798
Drug sales 0.783 0.940
- Opium/Cocaine 0.219 0.416
- Synthetic 0.280 0.385
- Marijuana 0.097 0.213
- Other 0.179 0.321
Incarceration Rate 1.708 3.593
Other Variables:
Population 402,428 1,104,949
Share of females 0.502 0.017
Share of people aged 18-64 0.649 0.034
Share of people aged 65+ 0.154 0.041
Share of whites 0.853 0.156
Share of manufacturing sector 0.086 0.080
State GDP§ 0.943 0.146
Marijuana recreational use laws 0.005 0.072
Marijuana medical use laws 0.162 0.369
Share of police force 0.003 0.002
Mortality rate (per 100,000 inhabitants):
All causes 905.589 132.308
Substance use/Mental disorders 10.939 5.714
Injuries 73.730 18.571
Neoplasms 208.572 27.077
Other non-communicable diseases 7.064 1.368
Forces of nature 0.537 0.619
Note: The number of observations is 11,115 (741 CZs and 15 years). § Relative
to the average state GDP in the US.
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Table A.2: Effect on Drug Quantities: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable MEs MEs MEs
PDMP -0.013 -0.016 -0.017
(0.029) (0.026) (0.026)
PMCL -0.171*** -0.201*** -0.210***
(0.026) (0.031) (0.032)
DSL 0.079** 0.088** 0.099**
(0.038) (0.039) (0.040)
NAL -0.012 -0.001 0.005
(0.033) (0.038) (0.038)
GSL -0.124** -0.135** -0.124**
(0.049) (0.053) (0.055)
Share of 65+ * post 2006 2.769***
(0.739)
Oxycodone in 2000 * post 2010 0.711**
(0.353)
Observations 11,115 11,115 11,115
Specification
Population Medicare OxyContin
Weights Part D Reformulation
Note: Population-weighted OLS estimates. Includes year, CZ and division-year
fixed effects. Other controls include indicators for: see note to Table 4. Errors
are clustered at the state level.
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
Table A.3: Effect on Drug Quantities: Adjacent Counties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable MEs MEs MEs MEs
PDMP -0.012 -0.013 -0.001 -0.003
(0.032) (0.037) (0.021) (0.036)
PMCL -0.163*** -0.147*** -0.100*** -0.220**
(0.035) (0.036) (0.028) (0.108)
DSL 0.095** 0.122** 0.104* 0.031
(0.044) (0.052) (0.052) (0.064)
NAL 0.012 0.077** 0.026 -0.147*
(0.039) (0.034) (0.042) (0.084)
GSL -0.140*** -0.172*** -0.024 -0.066**
(0.043) (0.038) (0.040) (0.026)
Observations 46,978 29,237 7,899 9,763
Sample Counties All Inner Outer Outer
Laws in Adjacent State . . Any None
Note: Population-weighted OLS estimates. Includes year, county and division-year fixed
effects. Other controls include indicators for: see note to Table 4. Errors are clustered at
the state level. The sample in column 3 contains outer counties where the adjacent state
has enacted at least one opioid law; the sample in column 4 contains outer counties where
the adjacent state does not have any of such laws enforced.
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
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Table A.4: Effect on Drug Quantities and Labour Market Participation: by Exposure to POs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable MEs ERate URate IRate
Panel A: Low POs in 2000
PDMP -0.010 0.008** 0.002 -0.010***
(0.017) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
PMCL -0.087*** 0.002 -0.006*** 0.004
(0.017) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
DSL -0.075*** 0.014** 0.006*** -0.020***
(0.019) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007)
NAL 0.011 0.006 -0.004** -0.002
(0.020) (0.012) (0.002) (0.012)
GSL 0.031 -0.011* -0.002 0.013*
(0.021) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007)
Observations 3,705 3,705 3,705 3,705
Panel B: Medium POs in 2000
PDMP 0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.022) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
PMCL -0.158*** 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.020) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
DSL 0.103* 0.010*** 0.002*** -0.012***
(0.061) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
NAL -0.041* 0.009** -0.002 -0.008*
(0.022) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
GSL -0.010 -0.010** 0.001 0.009**
(0.025) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Observations 3,705 3,705 3,705 3,705
Panel C: High POs in 2000
PDMP -0.023 -0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.048) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
PMCL -0.268*** 0.003 -0.002* -0.001
(0.047) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003)
DSL 0.114* 0.006 -0.000 -0.005
(0.062) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
NAL -0.005 -0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.062) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
GSL -0.267** 0.003 -0.002 -0.001
(0.109) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Observations 3,705 3,705 3,705 3,705
Note: Population-weighted OLS estimates. Includes year, CZ and division-year fixed ef-
fects. Other controls include indicators for: see note to Table 4. Errors are clustered at
the state level. ‘Low’, ‘Medium’ and ‘High’ exposure to POs is defined on the amount of
ME units in the CZ in 2000 relative to its distribution.
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
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Table A.5: Effect on Drug Quantities: All Substances
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable Hydromorphone Methadone Meperidine Oxycodone Hydrocodone Fentanyl Morphine
PDMP 0.001 -0.013 -0.000 -0.017 0.005 0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.015) (0.000) (0.016) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002)
PMCL 0.007* -0.078*** 0.000 -0.034*** -0.032*** -0.003*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.016) (0.000) (0.013) (0.005) (0.001) (0.007)
DSL -0.003* 0.030 -0.000 0.027 0.011 0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.021) (0.000) (0.017) (0.009) (0.001) (0.007)
NAL -0.005*** 0.007 0.000*** 0.018 -0.008* -0.002* -0.008**
(0.001) (0.029) (0.000) (0.016) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003)
GSL 0.003* -0.041 0.000 -0.054*** -0.005 -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.025) (0.000) (0.020) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
Observations 11,115 11,115 11,115 11,115 11,115 11,115 11,115
Note: Population-weighted OLS estimates. Includes year, CZ and division-year fixed effects. Other controls
include indicators for: see note to Table 4. Errors are clustered at the state level. Substances are rescaled as
follows: hydromorphone by 4, methadone by 7.5, meperidine by 0.1, oxycodone by 1, hydrocodone by 1, fentanyl
by 75, morphine by 1.
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
Table A.6: Effect on Mortality Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Opioid-Related Non Opioid-Related
All Substance
Injuries
Neoplasms Other Forces
Dependent variable Causes Use Disorders (All Cancers) Diseases of Nature
Panel A: POs
MEs 3.913** 1.067*** 0.826*** 0.290 0.005 -0.008
(1.667) (0.290) (0.222) (0.381) (0.024) (0.064)
Panel B: Laws
PDMP -0.258 -0.101 -0.161 0.321 0.014 0.010
(1.483) (0.215) (0.181) (0.464) (0.014) (0.022)
PMCL -0.688 0.778* -0.124 0.087 -0.006 0.004
(2.442) (0.448) (0.363) (0.694) (0.021) (0.024)
DSL -5.201** -0.482 -0.318 -0.588 -0.048 0.075
(2.317) (0.500) (0.362) (0.501) (0.036) (0.061)
NAL -5.364* 0.569 0.082 -1.192 -0.031* -0.000
(3.010) (0.370) (0.343) (0.948) (0.018) (0.035)
GSL -2.869 -0.767** -0.607** -0.761 -0.021 -0.082
(2.608) (0.330) (0.227) (0.670) (0.020) (0.058)
Observations 11,115 11,115 11,115 11,115 11,115 11,115
Note: Population-weighted OLS estimates. Includes year, CZ and division-year fixed effects. Other
controls include indicators for: see note to Table 4. Errors are clustered at the state level. ‘Substance
Use Disorders’ includes mental disorders; ‘Other Diseases’ includes non-communicable diseases such as
skin, eye and oral diseases and congenital defects; ‘Forces of Nature’ includes conflicts and terrorism.
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
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Table A.7: Effect on Labour Participation: by Gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female Male
Dependent variable ERate URate IRate ERate URate IRate
PDMP 0.001 0.000 -0.001* 0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
PMCL 0.002* -0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
DSL -0.001 0.001** 0.002* 0.000 0.001** 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
NAL -0.002 0.000 0.004 -0.003* 0.001 0.004
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
GSL 0.006*** -0.001** -0.007*** 0.006*** -0.001* -0.006***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 7,404 7,404 7,404 7,404 7,404 7,404
Note: Population-weighted OLS estimates. Includes year, CZ and division-year fixed ef-
fects. Other controls include indicators for: see note to Table 4. Errors are clustered at
the state level. Years 2005-2014 only.
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
Table A.8: Effect on Labour Participation: by Race
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
White Black Other
Dependent variable ERate URate IRate ERate URate IRate ERate URate IRate
PDMP 0.001 0.000 -0.002** -0.002** 0.000 0.002** 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
PMCL 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.002*** -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.004***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
DSL -0.001 0.001*** 0.003** 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
NAL -0.003* 0.000 0.004* -0.005 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
GSL 0.006*** -0.000 -0.008*** 0.007*** -0.002*** -0.005** 0.003 -0.001** -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 7,404 7,404 7,404 7,404 7,404 7,404 7,404 7,404 7,404
Note: Population-weighted OLS estimates. Includes year, CZ and division-year fixed effects. Other controls
include indicators for: see note to Table 4. Errors are clustered at the state level. Years 2005-2014 only.
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
Table A.9: Effect on Labour Participation: by Age Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Aged 16-24 Aged 25-44 Aged 45-64
Dependent variable ERate URate IRate ERate URate IRate ERate URate IRate
PDMP 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
PMCL 0.003 0.000 -0.003* 0.003* -0.000 -0.003** 0.003** 0.000 -0.003**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
DSL 0.001 0.002 -0.002* 0.001 0.001* -0.003 -0.001 0.001*** -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
NAL -0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002* 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GSL 0.006*** -0.001 -0.005*** 0.003** -0.002*** -0.001 0.004*** -0.002*** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 7,404 7,404 7,404 7,404 7,404 7,404 7,404 7,404 7,404
Note: Population-weighted OLS estimates. Includes year, CZ and division-year fixed effects. Other controls
include indicators for: see note to Table 4. Errors are clustered at the state level. Years 2005-2014 only.
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
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Table A.10: Effect on Crime: by Exposure to POs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable
Possession: Sale:
Cocaine Synthetic Marijuana Other Cocaine Synthetic Marijuana Other
Panel A: Low POs in 2000
PDMP -0.157 -0.171 -0.242 -0.316** -0.088 -0.225 -0.205 -0.401**
(0.225) (0.133) (0.226) (0.130) (0.197) (0.193) (0.174) (0.145)
PMCL -0.343 0.012 -0.589 0.310 -0.612 -0.239 -0.746** -0.288
(0.262) (0.270) (0.382) (0.375) (0.413) (0.507) (0.349) (0.340)
DSL -0.847* -0.719 -0.884 0.033 -0.034 0.424 -0.233 -0.018
(0.414) (0.458) (0.525) (0.421) (0.462) (0.631) (0.409) (0.442)
NAL 0.402 0.906*** 0.738 -0.113 0.219 0.952** 1.270*** 0.238
(0.355) (0.280) (0.488) (0.339) (0.305) (0.402) (0.309) (0.346)
GSL -0.906* -0.469 -1.410** -0.949** -1.286*** -0.855 -1.045** -0.641
(0.462) (0.492) (0.584) (0.425) (0.451) (0.558) (0.382) (0.438)
Observations 3,705 3,705 3,705 3,705 3,705 3,705 3,705 3,705
Panel B: Medium POs in 2000
PDMP -0.058 0.012 -0.243** -0.073 0.031 0.040 -0.072 -0.057
(0.080) (0.113) (0.093) (0.077) (0.110) (0.130) (0.071) (0.088)
PMCL 0.045 0.077 -0.019 -0.391** 0.015 0.173 -0.288** -0.088
(0.197) (0.175) (0.191) (0.155) (0.182) (0.134) (0.132) (0.134)
DSL 0.399** 0.636*** 0.408* 0.414** 0.324*** 0.527*** 0.147 0.282
(0.172) (0.160) (0.238) (0.178) (0.119) (0.156) (0.135) (0.232)
NAL 0.295** 0.239** -0.060 -0.040 0.323** 0.581*** 0.347*** 0.573***
(0.127) (0.098) (0.107) (0.108) (0.149) (0.145) (0.085) (0.107)
GSL -0.432** -0.583*** -0.246* 0.002 -0.388* -0.410 -0.319*** -0.248
(0.173) (0.180) (0.141) (0.122) (0.226) (0.266) (0.099) (0.154)
Observations 3,705 3,705 3,705 3,705 3,705 3,705 3,705 3,705
Panel C: High POs in 2000
PDMP -0.093 -0.185** -0.128* -0.087 -0.093 0.073 0.033 0.005
(0.070) (0.085) (0.067) (0.066) (0.087) (0.130) (0.057) (0.110)
PMCL 0.529*** -0.070 0.280* -0.020 0.312** 0.205 0.136 -0.040
(0.162) (0.157) (0.164) (0.162) (0.138) (0.175) (0.105) (0.172)
DSL 0.297 0.542** 0.397* 0.500*** 0.329 0.537** 0.096 0.265
(0.192) (0.243) (0.219) (0.100) (0.267) (0.216) (0.180) (0.205)
NAL 0.241 0.580 -0.229 0.114 0.351 0.096 0.288 0.589*
(0.220) (0.356) (0.157) (0.136) (0.281) (0.431) (0.238) (0.322)
GSL 0.025 0.102 -0.291*** -0.093 0.123 -0.368 -0.042 0.309
(0.120) (0.113) (0.107) (0.103) (0.103) (0.408) (0.107) (0.273)
Observations 3,705 3,705 3,705 3,705 3,705 3,705 3,705 3,705
Note: Population-weighted OLS estimates. Includes year, CZ and division-year fixed effects. Other controls
include indicators for: see note to Table 4. Errors are clustered at the state level. ‘Low’, ‘Medium’ and ‘High’
exposure to POs is defined on the amount of ME units in the CZ in 2000 relative to its distribution.
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
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Table A.11: Effect on Crime: by Age Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Possession: Sale:
Dependent variable Opium Synthetic Marijuana Other Opium Synthetic Marijuana Other
Panel A: Age Group 16-24
PDMP -0.107** -0.181** -0.178*** -0.039 -0.057 -0.617*** -0.045 0.483**
(0.044) (0.088) (0.057) (0.057) (0.085) (0.203) (0.085) (0.232)
PMCL 0.204 0.020 0.032 -0.018 0.102 0.450 -0.563*** -0.415*
(0.122) (0.114) (0.071) (0.088) (0.147) (0.300) (0.136) (0.214)
DSL -0.072 0.325* 0.110 0.074 0.217 0.135 0.121 0.040
(0.146) (0.193) (0.125) (0.081) (0.181) (0.243) (0.184) (0.260)
NAL 0.269* 0.430* -0.244* -0.313** 0.395** -0.019 0.097 -0.192
(0.138) (0.217) (0.128) (0.154) (0.167) (0.201) (0.085) (0.222)
GSL -0.441*** -0.723** -0.120 0.365*** -0.543 -0.686*** -0.272 0.609**
(0.118) (0.312) (0.098) (0.070) (0.375) (0.229) (0.164) (0.238)
Panel B: Age Group 25-44
PDMP -0.095** -0.105 -0.183*** -0.041 -0.119 -0.690*** -0.005 0.609**
(0.044) (0.073) (0.064) (0.056) (0.085) (0.198) (0.072) (0.248)
PMCL 0.254** 0.284** 0.110 -0.047 0.054 0.510* -0.539*** -0.233
(0.117) (0.138) (0.082) (0.110) (0.162) (0.294) (0.173) (0.212)
DSL 0.038 0.272 0.072 0.147 0.332* 0.147 0.127 -0.006
(0.149) (0.191) (0.124) (0.109) (0.179) (0.249) (0.185) (0.266)
NAL 0.198 0.513*** -0.232 -0.063 0.343* 0.133 0.098 -0.127
(0.133) (0.171) (0.146) (0.159) (0.174) (0.223) (0.088) (0.258)
GSL -0.386*** -0.608* -0.083 0.201*** -0.449 -0.471** -0.370** 0.710***
(0.116) (0.311) (0.105) (0.067) (0.359) (0.212) (0.159) (0.229)
Panel C: Age Group 45-64
PDMP -0.026 -0.031 -0.161** -0.014 -0.116 -0.469** -0.085 0.449**
(0.036) (0.061) (0.061) (0.057) (0.079) (0.178) (0.073) (0.214)
PMCL 0.138 0.262** 0.012 -0.039 -0.085 0.432* -0.544*** -0.346**
(0.102) (0.109) (0.078) (0.116) (0.148) (0.244) (0.186) (0.163)
DSL 0.081 0.271* 0.111 0.133 0.371** 0.168 0.115 0.063
(0.139) (0.159) (0.110) (0.084) (0.142) (0.217) (0.148) (0.213)
NAL 0.157 0.296* -0.197 0.045 0.354*** 0.240 -0.006 -0.327
(0.119) (0.153) (0.129) (0.139) (0.131) (0.195) (0.099) (0.242)
GSL -0.274** -0.979*** -0.117 0.110 -0.237 -0.581*** -0.276* 0.905***
(0.114) (0.313) (0.136) (0.083) (0.305) (0.190) (0.156) (0.208)
Observations 8,706 8,298 9,930 9,279 9,068 8,365 8,365 7,392
Note: Population-weighted OLS estimates. Includes year, CZ and division-year fixed effects. Other controls
include indicators for: see note to Table 4. Errors are clustered at the state level. The category ‘Opium’
comprises cocaine, opium and their derivatives; ‘Other’ encompasses all other non-narcotics.
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01.
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